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PROPERTY, ASPEN, AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 
ALAN j. MEESE* 
Free markets and the prosperity they create depend critically upon 
the institution of private property. Without property, markets would 
collapse, as parties would have nothing to trade. A nation with no prop-
erty rights would be very poor indeed; individuals would produce too 
few goods, while consuming too many. 
Property entails many rights, the most important of which is the right 
to exclude. Even at common law, however, this right was not absolute. 
Instead, courts qualified the right in rare cases when such qualification 
was necessary to facilitate the low-cost formation of efficient markets. 
Antitrust regulation follows this common law tradition, further qualifying 
rights of contract and property when necessary to prevent market failure. 
The Sherman Act, of course, does not mention property. Instead, 
Section 1 prohibits unreasonable contracts, and Section 2 forbids monop-
olization. Yet, contracts generally involve the disposition of property, 
and firms that monopolize often do so by exercising their property rights 
to the disadvantage of rivals. For instance, the classic (though rare) 
example of monopolization-predatory pricing-involves the manufac-
turer's use of its property to manufacture more property-a product-
and the subsequent sale of that property at a predatory price. Imposition 
of liability for this offense interferes with the right of an owner to use 
and dispose of his property as he sees fit. 
Section 2 also seeks to regulate what seems to be the opposite of 
predatory pricing-the refusal to sell one's property to certain customers 
at any price. Such refusals, it is said, can bolster a firm's monopoly position 
by denying rivals access to important inputs and thus raising rivals' costs 
of entry or expansion. Section 2 seeks to interdict those refusals that 
destroy more wealth than they create. 
The law on refusals to deal is extremely sparse, at least in Supreme 
Court precedent. This Symposium examines the most important decision 
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on such refusals, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.1 Aspen 
is important for two reasons. First, the decision articulates the general 
test governing refusals to deal. Second, on its facts, the decision applies 
the test in a way that established what the Supreme Court in Trinko 
recently called "the outer boundary of [Section] 2liability." 2 Thus, Aspen 
is what one might call a "paradigm case," that is, one that informs larger 
judicial thinking about the proper approach to refusals to deaJ.3 
This article sets forth the argument that Aspen was wrongly decided. 
Aspen, it is shown, erred in refusing to consider why the defendant in 
that case refused to deal with the plaintiff. In particular, the Court failed 
to notice that the defendant's refusal was part and parcel of the parties' 
renegotiation over the allocation of the fruits of their joint enterprise. 
When the plaintiff refused to accept the defendant's terms, the defendant 
made good on its threat-implicit in all bargaining-to refuse to deal 
with the plaintiff. The Court sustained the jury's finding that this refusal 
had no legitimate business purpose without first asking whether the 
terms that the defendant proposed were, in fact, unreasonable. Thus, the 
Court failed to consider the very real pos.sibility that the new agreement 
offered by the defendant was an effort to create a contractual property 
right that prevented the plaintiff from free riding on the defendant's 
promotional investments. By requiring the defendant to deal with the 
plaintiff, then, the Court unduly qualified the defendant's property rights 
and did so in a way that enhanced the prospect of opportunistic free 
riding by venture partners that decline to engage in promotional efforts. 
The analysis offered here does more than undermine the result in 
Aspen. It also calls into question efforts to generalize the decision beyond 
I 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
2 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
3 See John Shepard Wiley,Jr., Exclusionary Agreements, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw ll0 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (explaining that "definitive 
accounts of the governing cases [are] the type of evidence most persuasive to the judges 
who craft American antitrust policy and must grapple with precedent"); see also THOMAS 
S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 23 (2d ed. 1970) (analogizing 
scientific paradigms to "accepted judicial decisions in the common Jaw"); id. at 23-24 
(explaining how scientific community embraces those paradigms that purportedly solve 
the problems that are most salient to the community). 
It should be noted that I am using the term "paradigm" in the narrow, original sense, 
to refer to concrete problem solutions that a given profession has accepted as the basis for 
further research, often by analogy. THOMAS KuHN, The Essential Tension, in THE EssENTIAL 
TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 225-39 (1977) (articu-
lating Kuhn's original definition); THOMAS KuHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in id. at 
293, 294-308; id. at xvii-xx (recognizing that the definition of the concept expanded in 
THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTIFIC REVOLUTION to refer to the set of values and pre-commit-
ments shared by a particular scientific community). 
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its particular facts. For instance, courts and scholars have read Aspen for 
the more general proposition that a refusal to deal is particularly suspect 
if the parties previously dealt with one another, thus supposedly establish-
ing that such dealing is efficient. The actual facts of Aspen, however, 
seem to cut the other way. Moreover, relying upon Aspen as an example, 
courts and scholars have also suggested that a monopolist's discrimina-
tory treatment of rivals raises a presumption at least that the monopolist 
is engaged in unlawful exclusion. Here again, Aspen itself provides no 
support for this notion. Courts and scholars seeking to build a jurispru-
dence of exclusion will have to find a new paradigm case that draws a 
different "outer boundary" of liability under Section 2. 
I. PROPERTY, COOPERATION, AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Everyone agrees that society should promote "competition." But "com-
petition" is an ambiguous term.4 Long before the Sherman Act, or any 
other law, there was very fierce competition. In this "state of nature," 
humans competed with each other and animals for scarce resources that 
Mother Nature provided. The strongest (literally!) survived.5 
Though very competitive, the state of nature was not conducive to 
wealth creation. As judges Holmes and Easterbrook have put it, the war of 
all against all is not a blueprint for economic progress.6 Where economic 
resources flow to those with the most strength or guile, those with less 
strength and guile will under-invest in the creation and maintenance of 
wealth. No man will track and kill a bison if he knows that, having "made 
the kill," he must immediately tum the game over to a band of interloping 
hooligans. i Nor will he make the minor repairs necessary to maintain 
4 Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 480 (1977) (anti-
trust laws protect the overall process of competition and not individual competitors), with 
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273 n.3 (1966) (equating reduction in 
absolute number of rivals with reduction in competition). 
5 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104 ( 1950). 
6 See Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Easterbrook,].) ("The war of all against all is not a good model for any economy."); see 
also Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes,]., dissenting) 
(opining that the Sherman Act does not "make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes 
and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms"). 
7 Cf Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 180-81 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston,]., dissenting) ("Hence 
it follows, that our decision should have in view the greatest possible encouragement to 
the destruction of an animal, so cunning and ruthless in his career. But who would keep 
a pack of hounds; or what gentleman, at the sound of the horn, and at peep of day, 
would mount his steed, and for hours together, 'sub jove frigido,' or a vertical sun, pursue 
the windings of this wily quadruped, if, just as night came on, and his stratagems and 
strength were nearly exhausted, a saucy intruder, who had not shared in the honors or 
84 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 73 
or enhance the value of his hut, if, the repairs having been completed, 
his stronger neighbors can take possession.8 
Property severs the link between possession, on the one hand, and 
strength or guile, on the other. A social institution, property ensures 
that those who create wealth can keep it, thus establishing a direct 
link between the production of wealth and its possession.9 As such, the 
institution of property quite obviously improves upon the state of nature, 
providing all individuals, whether strong or weak, with the incentives to 
acquire, create, and preserve wealth.10 Man certainly has prospered as 
a result. 11 
Economic progress is not a solitary affair, however; most progress 
depends upon the cooperation of two or more individuals. 12 The institu-
tion of property creates the necessary foundation for such cooperation. 13 
A farmer who sells his crops to a "country dealer" can do so only because 
he has dominion and control of such crops, including the right not to 
sell them in the first place. 14 Moreover, the country dealer will only agree 
to purchase such crops if he can be certain that, having paid for the 
crops, he will be able to resell them without interference. Finally, the 
members of the exchange where the dealer resells the grain cannot 
create such a venture unless they have dominion and control over the 
labors of the chase, were permitted to come in at the death, and bear away in triumph 
the object of pursuit?"). 
8 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 ("[N]o man would be at trouble to provide 
either [shelter or clothing], so long as he had only a usufructuary property in them, which 
was to cease the instant that he quitted possession;-if, as soon as he walked out of his 
tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have a right to 
inhabit the one, and to wear the other."). 
9 See id. at *8 ("Necessity begat property; and, in order to insure that property, recourse 
was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants; 
states, governments, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties."); see 
also YO RAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2d ed. 1997) (defining 
economic property as "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good 
(or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange."); id. at 
3 (stating that "legal rights are the means to achieve the end" of economic property rights). 
10 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 347, 351-
57 (1967). 
11 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *7 (stating that the rise of agriculture depended upon 
institution of property); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 
33 j. ECON. HIST. 16, 16-27 (1973). 
12 See Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d at 188 ("[C]ooperation is the 
basis of productivity."). 
13 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 9-10 (explaining how delineation and enforcement of 
property rights facilitates transactions). 
14 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (evaluating restraint 
designed to facilitate transactions between country dealers and members of grain 
exchange). 
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premises of the entity and any elevators where the grain is stored. 15 In 
short, most useful economic cooperation depends upon the recognition 
and enforcement of property rights. 16 
While the protection of property supports the institution of contract, 
parties may also employ contract to create the equivalent of property. 
By negotiating enforceable limits on the behavior of trading partners, 
economic actors can ensure that certain actors reap the rewards of 
certain activities, thus creating the economic equivalent of a property 
rightY So, for instance, an employer can grant a salesman a partial 
property right in the fruits of his efforts by promising to pay him a 
fraction of the profits derived from the territory to which he is assigned. 
Central to this conception of property is the "right to exclude" others 
from that which is "yours." 18 In another context, the Supreme Court has 
opined that this "right to exclude" is the most important "stick" in the 
property owner's "bundle of rights." 19 Hence, it does no good for a 
farmer to "own" a piece of land if others can trample his crops with 
impunity.20 Nor does General Motors care to "own" a factory if its rivals 
can demand to use such facilities whenever they wish.21 
This "right to exclude" is usually absolute, at least as a legal matter. 
A farmer can exclude a rival from his land even if the rival offers to pay 
a "reasonable fee" for access. 22 Ditto for General Motors. The law protects 
this right to property with a panoply of civil and criminal remedies, even 
15 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 10 (explaining how the institution of property facilitates 
cooperation within the firm); Annen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization, 60 AM. EcoN. REv. 777, 781-83 (1972) (examining how 
the institution of the firm depends upon law's definition of residual claim as "property" 
of owner). 
16 See Demsetz, supra note 10, at 356-57 (explaining that assignment and enforcement 
of property rights facilitate voluntary transactions that overcome externalities); see also 
F.A. Hayek, Free Entelfrrise and Competitive Order, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 
110-11 (1948) ("[A] functioning market presupposes not only prevention of violence 
and fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as property, and the enforcement 
of con tracts."). 
17 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 14. 
18 See id. at 3-4; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *2 (defining "the right of property" 
as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."). 
19 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (Scalia, J.). 
20 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 3-4 (defining a property right as the ability to realize the 
fruits of a resource by consumption or exchange); Demsetz, supra note 10, at 354 (explain-
ing that when land is held in common, inability to exclude others prevents efficient 
investment). 
21 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. EcoN. REv. 47, 49 (1982). 
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 158 (1965) (defining an invasion of another's 
land as a trespass regardless whether the invader does harm or Jllakes owner whole); cJ. 
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going so far as to authorize reasonable private force when necessary to 
defend it.23 If General Motors spots Ford interlopers using its equipment, 
it can "call out the Pinkertons" and task these agents with expelling the 
trespassers, so long as they employ only reasonable force. 24 
It is no exaggeration to say that this right to exclude makes the private 
market work. Destruction of this right would undermine the process of 
striking private bargains-the bedrock of a free economy-giving way 
to private force or centrally determined transfers at state-determined 
rates.25 Private property-created and enforced by the State-is the foun-
dation of the institutional framework that makes the "free market" work. 26 
In rare cases, however, recognition and enforcement of an absolute 
right to exclude could reduce economic welfare. A homeowner who 
installs speakers on his roof and blares Mozart at midnight may impose 
more harm on his neighbors than he derives in benefits. A property 
owner who invoked an absolute right to exclude to drive a "hard bargain" 
with a state agency that hoped to purchase his land for a superhighway 
or airport could thereby generate significant transaction costs and destroy 
wealth.27 Finally, the owner of a dock who excludes a family whose sloop 
is about to sink in a storm may create a similar bargaining breakdown.28 
In each such case, private property premised upon an absolute right to 
exclude would result in negative externalities that destroy wealth, as 
id. §§ 195, 197 (detailing narrow exceptions in which individuals may enter land and pay 
resulting damages without incurring trespass liability). 
23 See id. § 77. 
24 /d. 
25 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rights, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1096-97 (1972) (explaining how 
absolute legal protection for property can facilitate private bargains and resulting allocation 
of resources); Demsetz, supra note 10 (explaining that existence of property rights facili-
tates bargaining); see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) 
(noting that destruction of the "individual right to contract [would] render difficult if 
not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce"). 
26 See R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 713, 716-18 
( 1992) (arguing allocation of resources in free market economy depends upon background 
rules); see also BARZEL, supra note 9, at 11-13 (explaining that concept of perfect competi-
tion depends on background assignment and enforcement of property rights); Hayek, supra 
note 16, at 110-16 (contending that a well-functioning market depends upon institutions of 
property, contract, and tort). Here I use the term "institutional framework" as a synonym 
for Professor Coase's "Institutional Structure of Production." See Coase, supra. 
27 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 55-56 (6th ed. 2003). See generally 
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (defining contours of "public use" 
requirement for exercise of eminent domain power). 
28 Ploof v. Pumam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); see also Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 
N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910) (holding that shipowner could lash ship to a dock during a 
storm but had to pay dock owner compensation for resulting damage); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §197 (1965) (articulating same principle). 
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parties would not be able to alter such results by contract.29 In other 
cases, reliance upon private bargains will destroy potential wealth by 
increasing transaction costs or producing prices above the true cost of 
utilizing the property in question, thus distorting the allocation of 
resources.30 
An institutional framework that seeks to maximize wealth must there-
fore seek to qualify the absolute right to exclude in some instances, 
relying upon "liability rules" to resolve competing claims to a particular 
resource. 31 So, for instance, the owner who blares his stereo at midnight 
will find himself under arrest or the defendant in a nuisance action, 
under the principle sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas-use your property 
so as not to harm another's.32 Moreover, should the same owner decline 
to sell his land at a reasonable price to the State for a public use, he 
will find his land condemned and receive a price thai the State deems 
reasonable. 33 Finally, the owner who uses force to exclude a sinking vessel 
from his dock will soon be a defendant in a trespass action and liable 
for any damages that resulted.34 Taken together, these various qualifica-
tions to the absolute right to exclude help make up an institutional 
framework that facilitates the movement of resources to their highest 
valued use.35 
29 SeeR.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 15-16 (1960) (arguing that 
where transaction costs are high, improper assignment of rights will prevent efficient 
allocation). 
so See, e.g., PosNER, sufrra note 27, at 54-60 (explaining that absolute right to exclude 
government from private property could result in bilateral monopoly, raising transaction 
costs and thereby wasting resources); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the 
Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553 (1993); PosNER, sufrra, 
at 117-18 (explaining how refusal to enforce such agreements reduces transaction costs); 
id. at 176-77 (explaining how doctrine of necessity reduces the cost of bargaining over 
property in situations of bilateral monopoly); see also Post v.Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 160 (1856) 
(courts will not enforce salvage contracts for exorbitant fees as such agreements would 
interfere with the interests of commerce). These scholars tend to focus on how qualifying 
the absolute right to exclude reduces the cost of transacting. It should also be noted that, 
even if transaction costs are zero, enforcement of such a right in these situations could 
lead to above-cost pricing, and this dynamic deters purchasers from engaging in cost-
justified activity. 
31 See Calabresi & Melamed, sufrra note 25, at 1106-10 (explaining distinction between 
property and liability rules); cf. R.H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A 
Comment, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 493,493 (1974) ("[T]he way in which property rights are defined 
can affect the costs of transactions, [and] any change in those rights will affect the 
transactions that are carried out."). 
32 Commonwealth v. Cyrus Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 63 (1851) (Shaw, CJ.). 
33 Calabresi & Melamed, sufrra note 25, at 1106-07 (employing eminent domain as 
paradigmatic example of a liability rule). 
34 See Ploof, 71 A. at 189-90. 
35 See BARZEL, sufrra note 9, at 13-15 (perfect competition and resulting allocation of 
resources depends on existence and enforcement of property rights); cf Coase, sufrra note 
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II. ANTITRUST LAW'S ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION 
OF PROPER1Y RIGHTS 
Still, consistent application of the institutional framework just 
described may nonetheless thwart the best allocation of resources in 
some cases, at least in the short run. For instance, relying upon the right 
to exclude-even as traditionally qualified under state law-a single 
individual or firm with a monopoly over a particular product could 
reduce production below the level consumers would desire and pay for. 36 
This result would only be possible because the State empowered the 
owner of these resources to determine how they were used, without 
input from consumers and rivalsY Absent such exclusion, rivals could 
use the putative monopolist's property to produce their own wares, wares 
they could sell in competition with the owner, driving prices toward the 
competitive level. 
The traditional qualified right to exclude can also support the collec-
tive exercise of monopoly power. By establishing clear rights in produc-
tive resources and the output from them, property law can facilitate 
collective decisions on output by otherwise independent firms. 38 The 
result, of course, could be an old-fashioned cartel, and output below 
what consumers would demand in the absence of bargaining costs.39 
Both of these results-cartel and monopoly-destroy wealth compared 
to the alternative. Absent a cartel agreement, rival firms would compete, 
thus increasing output and lowering prices to the competitive level. 40 
Moreover, no iron law of nature forces a monopolist to reduce its output 
and raise prices. Instead, such a firm altruistically could decide to 
enhance the public welfare by setting output higher than the profit-
maximizing level. Such a decision would enhance wealth when compared 
to the monopolistic alternative.41 
26, at 717-18 (a change in background rules can alter the content of transactions and 
thus impact the allocation of resources). 
36 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules, 11 J.L. & 
EcoN. 67 (1968) (explaining that absent transaction costs, consumers would pay monopo-
lists to increase output to competitive level). 
37 Cf Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 6Cl3 (1943). 
38 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 9-10 (explaining how recognition and enforcement of 
property rights facilitates bargaining between individuals and within firms). 
39 See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 67-70 (explaining how consumers would pay monopo-
lists to increase output in the absence of transaction costs); MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE AcTION 40 ( 1971) (explaining that successful cartels must overcome collective 
action problems). 
40 See DENNIS W. CARLTON &jEFFERY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
56-59 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining how perfect competition drives prices to marginal cost); 
id. at 69-73 (explaining how this result maximizes welfare). 
41 Cf id. at 95-96. 
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None of the common law regimes mentioned in Part I can reliably 
prevent such misallocation.42 By contrast, the Sherman Act creates a legal 
regime directed at cartels and monopolies, a regime designed to thwart 
harmful exercises of property rights.43 By combating monopolies and 
cartels, then, the Sherman Act could implement the sic utere principle 
in the pricing and output context, combating monopolistic output reduc-
tions that divert resources from their highest valued use and thereby 
reduce society's stock of wealth.44 
The police power account of the Sherman Act just sketched implies 
a simple and straightforward enforcement policy. First, enforcers should 
attack, and courts should condemn, any firm that possesses monopoly 
power. Second, courts and enforcers should attack agreements between 
rivals on price or output. Such regulation can eliminate externalities, 
just like a ban on late-night music or pollution.45 
Still, the simple policy just sketched is emphatically not the law, at 
least not in the United States.46 For one thing, the law regularly allows 
rivals or potential rivals to agree on price or output. The classic example 
is the agreement of merger or partnership, whereby otherwise indepen-
dent entities or individuals agree to combine their talents and resources, 
which they then operate in common as a single entity. Such transactions 
and the entities they create quite obviously involve price fixing, and they 
may also reduce output, at least under some metrics.47 Nonetheless, 
courts analyze the creation of such entities under a forgiving rule of 
42 To be sure, common law courts decline to enforce contracts in restraint of trade. See 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-82 (6th Cir. 1898) (summarizing 
common law). However, mere non-enforcement does not always prevent cartel pricing. 
Nor can such non-enforcement prevent monopoly pricing if there are non-contractual 
barriers to entry. 
43 See john Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy, and the Social "Science" of Economics, 33 
ANTITRUST BULL. 713, 730 n.22 (1988) ("Antitrust policy [is] part of the fundamental 
laws defining the scope of property and contract rights."). 
44 See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 67-70 (explaining that antitrust laws induce firms to 
replicate the output and resulting prices for which consumers would bargain in the absence 
of transaction costs); see also Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative E.ra, 79 
B.U. L. REv. I (1999) (explaining how formative-era Sherman Act decisions rested upon 
a police power conception of appropriate regulation). 
45 See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 70. 
46 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, art. 82 (ex. art. 
86), 37 I.L.M. 56, 94 (forbidding "abuse ... of a dominant position" including "imposing 
unfair purchase or selling prices" or "limiting production . . . to the prejudice of 
consumers"). 
47 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. I, 9 (1979) (explaining that partnerships 
quite literally involve price fixing); id. at 23 (explaining that mergers extinguish competi-
tion and involve price fixing); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 106-08 (1984) (defining output as raw number of games broadcast, without regard 
to quality). 
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reason." 48 Moreover, coordination on price and output within extant 
firms is lawful per se, even if such coordination facilitates monopoly 
pricing.49 More recently, courts have held that price fixing and output 
restrictions between separate firms are properly analyzed under the rule 
of reason, so long as such conduct is ancillary to some larger, legitimate 
venture or might otherwise produce benefits that courts deem cogniz-
able.50 The rationale for such counterintuitive holdings is simple: While 
such restrictions reduce rivalry on price or output, they may at the 
same time overcome market failures that unbridled competition would 
produce. 51 In many instances, such restraints overcome these failures by 
creating contract rights that are the economic equivalent of property 
rights, inducing parties to internalize the results of their actions and, 
thus, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. 52 Like all prop-
erty, these restraints reduce "competition" in one sense, but all may 
48 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
( 1992, revised 1997), available a( http:/ /www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (articulating 
standards that enforcement agencies apply when deciding whether to challenge horizontal 
mergers). Among other things, these Guidelines require a plaintiff to define a relevant 
market and show that the defendant's share is such that the challenged transaction can 
create market power. See id. §§ 1.1, 1.2 (market definition);§§ 1.4, 1.5 (articulating concen-
tration thresholds); FTC v. Tenet Health Care, 186 F.3d 1045, 1051-54 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that plaintiff must establish that merger will produce harm in relevant market 
to make out prima facie case against transaction); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co., 85 F. 271,280 (6th Cir. 1898) (explaining how restrictions in the articles of partnership 
upon the business activities of the members "were to be encouraged") (emphasis added). 
49 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that intra-
enterprise agreements cannot offend§ 1 of the Sherman Act); see also Arizona v. Maricopa 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (declaring horizontal "maximum" price fixing between 
independent entities unlawful per se); id. at 357 (noting price fixing between members 
of a single partnership would be "perfectly proper"); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1985) (stating antitrust law does not regulate prices set by a 
monopolist); Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that, under current law, "the producers of Star Trek, may decide to release 
two episodes a week and grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though this reduces 
the number of times episodes appear on TV''); Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding agreement between airline and travel agents 
setting price latter can charge is lawful per se). 
50 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-105; Chicago Profl Sports, 95 F.3d at 598 (declaring output 
limitations subject to relaxed rule of reason analysis given extent of integration between 
the parties); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-82 (3d Cir. 1993); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 223-30 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, 
].); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776F.2d 185,188-91 (7th Cir.1985) (Easterbrook, 
].). But see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding that division of 
territories ancillary to a legitimate joint venture was unlawful per se). 
51 See Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188 ("Cooperation is the basis of productivity."). 
52 See generally Alan ]. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 553 (2004) (explaining how intrabrand restraints, such as minimum resale price 
maintenance and exclusive territories, can create the economic equivalent of property 
rights and thus overcome market failures). 
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enhance rivalry by facilitating production, promotion, and distribution. 53 
Only "naked" restraints, that is, restrictions that reduce rivalry without 
plausibly combating market failure or otherwise enhancing efficiency, 
are outright unlawful.54 
The law shows similar ambivalence toward pricing by monopolists. 
Under current law-and over a century of unbroken precedent-firms, 
including monopolists, may charge whatever the market will bear. 55 This 
rule holds even though monopoly pricing harms consumers and distorts 
the allocation of resources. 56 Instead, monopolists only offend the Sher-
man Act if they obtain or maintain their monopoly through tactics that 
courts deem to be "exclusionary."57 
Of course, just about any successful tactic a monopolist employs can 
be labeled exclusionary. A firm that builds a better mousetrap, or builds 
an average mousetrap at lower cost, excludes its rivals from the market. 
Ditto for a firm that comes up with a superior system of distribution. 
Nothing excludes rivals more surely than high-quality products sold at 
a low price.58 
As a result, courts have articulated a more precise, and more narrow, 
definition of exclusion applicable under Section 2. That is, courts have 
held that a monopolist's practices are only exclusionary for antitrust 
purposes if the tactics drive rivals from the market on some basis other 
53 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REv. 
77, 134-41 (2003); see also Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
687-88 (1978) (explaining that the enforcement of many contracts is necessary to a 
well-functioning market). 
54 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with 
Defenses, 77 CEO. LJ. 165, 172-73 ( 1988) (explaining how the application of per se rule 
depends upon possible presence of redeeming virtues); see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 
(holding an agreement is ancillary and thus analyzed under the rule of reason if it arguably 
"promoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted"). 
55 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407-08 (2004); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1920) 
(mere size cannot offend§ 2); see also jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 
2, 14 (1985) (stating that the law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market 
power by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by 
attempting to impose restraints on competition, on the other). 
56 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (explaining how monopoly pricing can 
distort the allocation of resources). 
57 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 (1992) 
(holding plaintiff must show that the defendant both possesses monopoly power and used 
that power to foreclose competition and thus protect its monopoly); Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
58 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, fEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 553 (2d ed. 1999) ("Nothing 
is a more effective barrier to entry than a firm's capacity to produce a high quality product 
at a low price, or to provide improved service to its customers."). 
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than efficiency.59 So, while a monopolist may exclude its rivals from the 
market by producing a better or cheaper mollsetrap, it may not exclude 
rivals by, for instance, entering an exclusive contract that deprives rivals 
of important inputs, without any plausible efficiency justification.60 
Courts treat the former-building a better mousetrap and the like-
as "competition on the merits" and, therefore, not worthy of judicial 
scrutiny.61 By contrast, agreements that exclude rivals from a significant 
source of inputs are presumptively unlawful, and current law makes it 
quite difficult to rebut this presumption once it arises.62 
As defined by the courts, competition on the merits is technological 
in nature and involves activities that take place within individual firms, 
without contractual cooperation with other actors. Classic examples of 
such rivalry include efforts to manipulate technology so as to create a 
new product (innovation) and efforts to employ existing technology to 
realize economics of scale.63 At one time, the law's hands-off approach 
to this sort of rivalry rested upon a belief that such conduct-which did 
not interfere with similar efforts by rivals-could not create or maintain 
a monopoly, at least for long.64 So long as everyone was free to employ 
59 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600 ("The central message of the Sherman Act is that a business 
entity must find new customers and higher profits through internal expansion-that is, 
by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties with its competitors."); see also 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (holding that Sherman Act does not 
forbid monopoly obtained or maintained by superior skill or business acumen); United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding that 
conduct that simply conforms to uniform economic laws cannot violate§ 2). 
60 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
61 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (holding§ 2 does not forbid above-cost pricing that preserves a monopoly); At!. 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339-40 (1990) (noting maximum resale 
price maintenance only creates antitrust injury if it causes dealers to price below cost); 
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding realization of economies of scale and resulting maintenance of monopoly power 
cannot offend § 2); see also Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600 (firms must seek new profits through 
internal expansion and not cooperation with others); United Shoe, 110 F. Supp at 344-45 
(distinguishing between "competition based on pure merit," on the one hand, and con-
tracts, policies and arrangements designed to further the dominance of a particular firm). 
62 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-86; Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 68-71. 
63 See Alan]. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REv. 
743, 757-62 (2005) (describing technological nature of competition on the merits). 
64 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (concluding that absence 
of prohibition against "monopoly in the concrete" rested upon assumption that "the 
operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely 
contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous 
or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolis-
tic tendency were permitted. In other words that freedom to contract was the essence of 
freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract."). 
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such tactics, it was said, a level playing field would ensure significant 
consumer-friendly rivalry.65 
More recently, neoclassical price theory and welfare economics have 
suggested another rationale for this hands-off approach to merits-based 
rivalry. Even if such tactics lead to or maintain a monopoly and produce 
a deadweight loss, the resulting monopoly may still be necessary to 
realize efficiencies that a less concentrated industry would not produce.66 
Assume for a moment that a firm takes advantage of current technology 
and grows to monopoly by realizing economies of scale and thereby 
underprices rivals.6i So long as these economies produce non-trivial cost 
savings, the resulting monopoly will produce more wealth than it destroys 
and thus be "reasonable" under a "total welfare" approach to the statute.68 
Courts have uniformly held that the mere realization of such economies 
cannot give rise to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if 
monopoly results.69 
65 See Alan J. Meese, supra note 44, at 15-18 (outlining classical paradigm's approach 
to regulation); see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 (noting that absent state imposition of 
monopoly, so-called "normal" competitive practices could not lead to permanent monop-
oly); Thomas M. Cooley, Limits of State Control of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REv. 233, 
259-60 (1878) (contending that, absent state aid, firms could not price above competitive 
level unless they departed from "regular business" method, and resorted to "violence and 
terror"). Indeed, this rationale protected more than mere technological rivalry, but also 
protected any "normal" business practice, i.e., any practice that parties would adopt regard-
less of an expectation of market power. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 
U.S. 32, 63-65 (1918) (holding§ 2 does not forbid agreements that parties would adopt 
absent expectation of market power). 
66 See joE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 84 (1948) ("In most 
industries a very small firm is quite inefficient; as the firm becomes larger it tends to 
become more efficient, reaching a minimum cost per unit of output at some particular 
scale."); GEORGEj. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICE 132-42 (1942). 
67 See HovENKAMP, supra note 58, at 27-36 (describing concept of economies of scale 
and natural monopolies). 
68 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeojfs, 58 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 18 (1968) (explaining how merger to monopoly that produces non-trivial 
efficiencies will enhance overall welfare despite misallocation of resources resulting from 
exercise of market power); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman 
Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) (contending that Sherman Act only bans those arrangements 
that distort the allocation of resources without any offsetting efficiencies). But see Robert 
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Intmpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982) (contending that Congress designed 
Sherman Act to ban all restraints that exercise market power to the detriment of purchasers 
in the relevant market, regardless of associated efficiency gains). 
69 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (noting above-cost pricing is competition on the merits even if it drives less efficient 
rivals out of business); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F2.d 263, 274-75, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1979); see also 
United States v. United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding§ 2 
does not forbid "competition based on pure merit"); WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, THE ANTI-
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Price theory's static welfare framework does not tell the whole story, 
however. Mter all, this framework assumes that technology and the 
resulting production function is given, and all firms in a given industry 
are subject to the same technologicallaws.7° In the "real world," however, 
technology is not constant or exogenous but, instead, is subject to manip-
ulation and improvement by actual or potential market participants.71 
At the same time, the pace and nature of such manipulation depends, 
at least in part, upon background legal rules, including antitrust rules.72 
The most typical background rule takes the form of patent law, which 
confers upon inventors the exclusive property right to practice and 
employ a particular innovation for a fixed term of years.73 In this way, 
it is said, patent law confers a sort of bounty upon inventors, allowing 
them to reap the reward from their investments in innovation.74 Such 
rights do not always confer monopoly or market power; they may simply 
allow the inventor to recoup his costs, including a reasonable rate of 
return.75 In those cases where they do confer such power, however, the 
resulting profits act as a reward for innovative efforts, efforts that often 
TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 124 (1914) (explaining that the Shennan Act is not 
designed to "destroy the larger businesses whose capital and large plants enable them to 
produce goods cheaply, in order that small plants that cannot produce them as cheaply 
may live."); id. at 126 ("It is possible for the owners of a business of manufacturing and 
selling useful articles of merchandise so to conduct their business as not to violate the 
inhibitions of the anti-trust law and yet to secure to themselves the benefit of the economies 
of management and of production due to the concentration under one control of large 
capital and many plants. If they use no other inducement than the constant low price of 
their product and its good quality to attract custom, and their business is a profitable one, 
they violate no law."). 
70 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 7-8 (1965). 
71 See id. at 83-86 (treating entrepreneurial innovation and related technological progress 
as an unalloyed good). 
72 While all economists and antitrust scholars would agree with this assumption, there 
has always been significant disagreement regarding which antitrust rules will result in the 
most innovation. Exemplars of the debate include: Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-
Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (2002); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 70, at 
82-89 (examining link between concentration and innovation and entrepreneurship); 
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
75 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101. 
74 See WARD j. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAw: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL 2 (1973) ("A patent is a legal device to ensure that there can be a property 
right in certain ideas. Thus the temporary right of a patentee to exclude others is a means 
of preventing 'free riding' so that the employment of useful private resources may be 
remunerated. Without a patent system, prevention of free riding would be severely 
limited."). 
75 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & Pus. 
PoL'Y 108 (1990); see also Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. 
L. REv. 253, 304 (2003) ("Patent rights do not preclude competition or guarantee monopo-
listic evils. They merely provide a right to exclude others from a particular innovation .... 
Whether a patent confers monopoly power depends entirely on how much value the 
patent has compared to other market options."). 
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pay zero or negative returns. 76 Without the prospect of such occasional 
bounties, firms would lack the necessary incentives to incur the sunk 
costs of research and development.77 
These considerations are not limited to intellectual property. Many 
improvements cannot be patented, and one cannot patent managerial 
skill or a well-deserved reputation for high quality. Nonetheless, these 
improvements enhance society's welfare and may, in some cases, lead 
to or protect a monopoly.78 They also require significant investments, 
investments that do not always pay off. Ordinary property law, as well as 
the law of trademark and unfair competition, help ensure that firms can 
realize the fruits of these efforts, when there are in fact fruits to realize.79 
A hands-off attitude toward such competition on the merits under the 
Sherman Act bolsters these rights, or at least does not undermine them, 
and therefore assures that firms will be able to reap the rewards of their 
efforts.80 To be sure, recognition and enforcement of these property 
rights makes entry by rivals more difficult, but courts have recognized 
that such difficulty is the necessary byproduct of legitimate competi-
tive activity.81 
76 See ROBERT P. MERGES &jOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAw & POLICY: CASES & MATERIALS 
2 (3d ed. 2002). 
77 See BowMAN, supra note 74, at 2 ("Ability to keep secrets and to enforce private 'know-
how' contracts would, without patent law, provide inventors very limited protection from 
rapid and widespread copying by others. Central to the economic justification of a patent 
system is the presumption that without the patent right, too few resources would be 
devoted to invention."). 
78 See HovENKAMP, supra note 58, at 553 (the production of high-quality products at a 
low price serves as a "barrier to entry"). 
79 SeeElhauge, supra note 75, at 274-79, 295-98; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 269-70 (1987) (explaining 
how trademark law encourages investments in quality of products sold under the marks). 
80 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407-08 (2004) ("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging 
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what 
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly 
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive 
conduct."); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 332-33, 343-45 (D. 
Mass. 1953) (research and resulting patents that interfered with competition did not 
offend § 2 of the Sherman Act). See also Elhauge, supra note 75, at 295-305; Fred S. 
McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field of Competition 
Law, 52 EMORY LJ. 1401, 1418-20 (2002) (explaining how protection of ordinary property 
rights can facilitate innovation and enhance welfare). 
81 See United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We fail to 
see how the existence of good will achieved through effective service is an impediment 
to, rather than the natural result of, competition."); see also Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. 
FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1999); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining why the Sherman Act does not 
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III. REFUSALS TO DEAL 
The Sherman Act's safe harbor for technology-based competition on 
the merits would seem to imply a strong right to refuse to deal with 
rivals. Absent such a right, a firm that built and patented a better mouse-
trap would have to share its know-how with rivals, thus thwarting its 
efforts to exploit its invention.82 In the same way, without such a right, 
a firm that realized economies of scale and thereby could underprice 
rivals, would have to share its facilities with those rivals, or at least sell 
the rivals a portion of its output for a reasonable price.83 So, for instance, 
if Ford could realize economies of scale on its pick-up assembly line and 
thus underprice its rivals, GM or other competitors would have the right 
to use Ford's facilities during off-hours.84 Rivals could even demand to 
purchase excess output from Ford at a reasonable price, i.e., Ford's 
(lower) cost of production plus a reasonable rate of return. The recogni-
tion of competition on the merits as a category of conduct beyond 
antitrust scrutiny implies a right to refuse to deal in these circumstances 
and thus would require courts to reject such efforts to compel a monopo-
list to share its output, inventions, or facilities.85 
Yet, the right to refuse to deal is not absolute under the Sherman Act. 
Most importantly, a monopolist may not threaten such refusal to induce 
suppliers or customers to agree not to deal with its rivals.86 In these cases, 
the gravamen of the violation is the underlying agreement and not the 
condemn "efficient monopolies" despite the fact that such efficiency means rivals cannot 
compete); United States v. Syury Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 669 (9th Cir. 1990) (reputation 
obtained. through superior service is not an anticompetitive barrier to entry). 
82 See Elhauge, supra note 75, at 275-76 (noting that ability to realize the fruits of 
investment in a better product depends upon ability to exclude rivals who seek access to 
intellectual or other property necessary to produce the product); Glenn 0. Robinson, On 
Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 1177, 1192-93 (2002). 
83 Robinson, supra note 82. 
84 Cf Demsetz, supra note 21, at 49 (explaining how property rights that empower firm 
to exclude rivals from its factory create barriers to entry by raising rising rivals' costs of 
production); see also Wesley J. Liebeler, Exclusion and Efficiency, 11 REG. 34, 38 (1987) 
("[E]xclusionary rights take the form of legal barriers to entry; their purpose and effect 
is to raise others' (including rivals') costs of using goods protected by the barriers. Ford 
Motor Company, for example, cannot, use a General Motors plant without incurring the 
cost of getting the latter's permission."). 
85 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187-89 (1st Cir. 
1994) (monopolist may refuse to deal if such refusal is necessary to vindicate intellectual 
property rights); see also Meese, supra note 63, at 761-62 (explaining that competition on 
the merits is a property-based concept); Elhauge, supra note 75, at 294-305 (explaining how 
refusals to deal enhance competition by allowing firms to realize fruits of their investments). 
86 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (scrutinizing East-
man Kodak's agreement to supply spare parts to customers on the condition that they 
not deal with rival independent service organizations); Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
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threatened refusal to deal that induced it. By its nature, all negotiation, 
and thus all contracts, entail at least a threatened refusal to deal.87 
At the same time, and despite the safe harbor for competition on the 
merits, courts have condemned certain naked refusals to deal, that is, 
refusals not linked to any agreement with a supplier to disadvantage 
rivals. Aspen, of course, was such a case, as are any number of lower 
court decisions invoking the related essential facilities doctrine.88 These 
decisions all require monopolists to sell vital inputs to rivals at court-
determined prices in certain narrowly defined circumstances.89 While 
the law on this point is not entirely clear, some have read these decisions 
as establishing a more general rule requiring a monopolist to justify to 
a court's satisfaction any refusal to sell vital inputs to rivals.90 
At first blush, any antitrust regulation of refusals to deal would appear 
inconsistent with the safe harbor for competition on the merits. Mter 
all, such regulation effectively preempts the State's absolute right to 
exclude and replaces that right with a much weaker form of protection 
akin to that which citizens enjoy against governments that take their 
property for a public use.91 Put another way, these decisions grant a 
monopolist's rivals the power to condemn the monopolist's property, 
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (condemning monopoly newspaper's agreement to deal with 
advertisers on the condition that they not purchase advertising from rival radio station). 
87 See BARZEL, supra note 9, at 9-10 (explaining how law's creation and enforcement of 
property rights facilitates bargaining); Robinson, supra note 82, at 1178-79 (explaining 
that refusals to deal are generally "means to ends"); id. at 1188 (explaining that, in such 
cases, a refusal to deal is unlawful "only because it is a component of behavior that is 
illegal on it~ own terms, [so that] the refusal clement is supedluous. "). 
88 See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986) (condemning 
prospective refusal by bidder for basketball team to allow rival bidder to use stadium). 
89 See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1209-11 
(9th Cir. 1997); Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179-80 
(1990) (condemning monopolist's refusal to sell inputs to rival at reasonable prices); 
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 532-38. But see Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407-11 (2004) (stating that mere refusal to deal with rivals does. 
not itself require a defendant to offer a justification for such conduct) (alternate holding). 
90 See, e.g., jonathan B. Baker, Promoting lnni!Vation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak 
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 495, 500-03 (1999). Other scholars disagree with this character-
ization, arguing that the law properly requires a plaintiff to show an anticompetitive effect 
before courts will saddle defendants with a burden of justifying such a refusal. See Timothy 
J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 693 (2000) (criticizing 
FTC's approach to monopolization law as unduly hostile to conduct that is potentially 
procompetitive); see also Robinson, supra note 82, at 1201 & n.98 (characterizing doctrine 
regarding refusals to deal as "unguided" and "nebulous"). 
91 See supra notes 27 and 33 and accompanying text (explaining how power of eminent 
domain interferes with absolute right to exclude). 
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so long as they pay reasonable compensation to the monopolist, that is, 
a reasonable price for the monopolist's product.~2 
Still, a requirement that monopolists justify all refusals to sell vital 
inputs to rivals would not necessarily contravene the safe harbor for 
competition on the merits.93 No decision establishes a per se requirement 
that monopolists deal with rivals. Instead, these decisions allow monopo-
lists to argue that dealing with rivals is not feasible, if such dealing 
imposes unreasonable costs on the monopolist.94 Thus, a monopolist 
that had achieved its position by realizing economies of scale or investing 
in innovation could justifY the exclusion of a rival from its factory or 
new technology by arguing that it, and not the rival, should be entitled 
to determine the output of the factory it constructed and, thereby, reap 
the rewards of its investment, which made the realization of technological 
efficiencies possible in the first place.95 At the same time, none of these 
decisions purports to require a monopolist to sell its final product to 
rivals.96 Any plausible construction of the law on refusals to deal leaves 
the right to engage in paradigmatic, technological competition on the 
merits entirely intact. 
I do not mean to suggest that a rule requiring monopolists to justify 
any and all refusals to deal would produce optimal results. Defendants 
cannot always explain just why they must refuse to sell to rivals, and 
antitrust counsel may do a poor job translating those explanations to 
courts.97 Even when such explanations are possible, the process of expla-
nation consumes resources, and courts may in some cases wrongly refuse 
to credit valid explanations. Moreover, while judges and the enforcement 
92 See Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 902 F.2d at 179-80 (holding that 800% increase in 
price of input sold to rivals suggested that defendant was engaged in unlawful exclusionary 
conduct); see also Elhauge, supra note 75, at 303-05 (analogizing a requirement that a 
defendant deal with rivals to the imposition of a "liability rule"). 
93 But see Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407-11 (without more, mere refusal to deal by a monopolist 
does not give rise to antitrust liability). 
94 See, e.g., Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 902 F.2d at 179. 
95 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187-89 (1st Cir. 
1994) (holding monopolist may decline to license its intellectual property to reap the 
returns from its investments). 
96 See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-78 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (explaining that a rival has "no right under the antitrust laws to take a free 
ride on its competitors' sales force. You cannot conscript your competitor's salesmen to 
sell your product even if the competitor has monopoly power and you are a struggling 
new entrant."). So, for instance, the law would not require Ford to sell its pick-up trucks 
to General Motors at a "reasonable price," even if Ford was a monopolist. 
97 See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule 
of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 461, 485-86 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of 
Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 5 (1986) (explaining why firms may not always understand 
just why they adopt a particular practice). 
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agencies have come a long way from the "inhospitality era" of antitrust, 
they are still unduly hostile to arguments that conduct is lawful because 
it produces significant benefits.98 For instance, even if a defendant shows 
that conduct produces benefits, courts will still condemn the arrange-
ment if the plaintiff can show that the defendant could achieve the same 
benefits in another, less anticompetitive, manner.99 This result may occur 
even though proof that conduct produces benefits often undermines 
the logical basis for any presumption that the conduct results in any 
anticompetitive harm in the first place. 100 At the same time, to the extent 
that courts might require defendants to justify any refusal, they seem to 
be amenable to a showing, if made to the court's satisfaction, that the 
restriction is necessary to further competition on the merits. Indeed, 
the Aspen Court itself opined that a refusal to deal that furthered competi-
tion on the merits would not offend Section 2, even if it impaired the 
opportunities of rivals. 101 
IV. REFUSALS TO DEAL, CONTRACTUAL COMPETITION, 
AND ASPEN 
The Supreme Court's Trinka decision seems to reject any general 
requirement that monopolists justify a refusal to deal, thereby providing 
dominant firms with significant leeway to reap the rewards from success-
ful competition on the merits.102 At the same time, the decision may be 
limited to its particular context, that of a regulated industry where an 
expert agency was empowered to enforce a duty to deal. 103 Moreover, 
98 See generally Meese, supra note 53, at 144-70 (explaining how current rule of reason 
methodology is unduly biased against restraints that overcome market failure). 
99 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 484-86 (1991) 
(existence of less restrictive altemative would thwart monopolist's justification of refusal 
to deal and other exclusionary conduct). 
100 See Meese, supra note 53, at 161-70 (explaining how proof that a restraint produces 
benefits undermines presumption that restriction produces harm and thus also undermines 
basis for application of less-restrictive altemative test). 
101 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,605 n.32 (1985) 
('"Thus, 'exclusionary' comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to 
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on 
the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.") (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & 
DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)). 
102 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407-08 (2004). 
103 See id. at 411 ("Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure 
and circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic context is 
an awareness of the significance of regulation."); see also Alan J. Meese, Regulation of 
Franchisor opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competi-
tion Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 61 (1999) (arguing that background 
rules generated by state law can alter transaction costs and thus undermine the rationale 
for antitrust regulation of opportunism). 
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the Trinka Court reaffirmed the holding in Aspen, which sustained a 
jury's condemnation of a monopolist's refusal to deal with a former 
venture partner because that refusal did not further competition on the 
merits. 104 In so doing the Court opined that Aspen is at or near the outer 
boundary of Section 2 liability." 105 
Any conclusion that all is well with the law governing refusals to deal 
would be premature, however. All useful competition does not fit within 
the paradigm of technological rivalry that courts describe as competition 
on the merits. Much "competition" is of a contractual nature, as firms 
rely upon agreements with others to facilitate productive cooperation 
and, thus, rivalry with other ventures. 106 As noted earlier, such contracts 
can create the functional equivalent of property rights, internalize exter-
nalities, and, thus, overcome market failures. 107 A classic example is 
an exclusive territory ancillary to a joint venture between rivals that 
manufactures a product that the rivals distribute in turn.108 By assigning 
each rival to a particular territory, such a contractual restriction can 
ensure that firms internalize the full benefits of promotional expendi-
tures by preventing other venture members from free riding on the 
firm's efforts. 109 Like actual property, then, such agreements can ensure 
that firms "reap what they sow" and facilitate the production of useful 
information. no Indeed, modern economic theory concludes that the firm 
itself is a type of non-standard contract, distinguished by the presence 
of a single, residual claimant who holds a property right in the net 
product of the nexus of contracts.lll Much unilateral competition on 
the merits depends upon the recognition and enforcement of such 
agreements. 112 
The realization that useful competition can take a contractual form 
implies a broader right to refuse to deal with rivals-including venture 
104 See Trinka, 540 U.S. at 408-11; Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605 (defining unlawful exclusion 
as conduct that harms rivals without furthering competition on the merits). 
105 See Trinka, 540 U.S. at 409. 
106 See Meese, supra note 53, at 134-41 (describing so called "contractual competition"). 
107 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
108 Cf United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
109 See Meese, supra note 52; see also McChesney, supra note 80, at 1418-22 (explaining 
how contracts can create the economic equivalent of property rights that overcome mar-
ket failure). 
110 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (explaining how property can facilitate 
productive activity in this manner). 
111 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 15, at 782-83 (explaining that firms are distin-
guished by presence of residual claimant with authority to contract with various team 
members that supply inputs). 
112 See Meese, supra note 63, at 837-38. 
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partners-than a safe harbor for refusals to deal incidental to merits-
based competition. Mter all, such contractual competition takes place 
within a given technological framework and does not purport to realize 
or produce technological efficiencies analogous to economies of scale. 113 
Nor does such competition directly produce technological innovations 
or new products. 114 Still, in some cases, the realization of such contractual 
efficiencies may require a monopolist to decline to deal with a rival or 
at least to deal on terms that courts may deem "unreasonable." Aspen 
may well have been just such a case. 
A. ASPEN 
The facts of Aspen are straightforward. At one time, three separate 
firms owned and operated one mountain apiece in the Aspen region. 115 
Originally, each company offered skiers half-day or full-day tickets for 
the use of its own mountain. 116 In 1962 the otherwise independent firms 
entered a joint venture of sorts, agreeing to offer a joint, six-day, all-
Aspen ticket. 117 For a flat fee, skiers purchased the option to ski all three 
mountains during the six-day period, without tying themselves down to 
any particular mountain in advance. 118 Those who purchased the ticket 
received six coupons, each good for a day of skiing on any of the 
mountains in question. The parties divided the revenues from the joint 
ticket proportionately, according to the number of coupons collected 
at each mountain. 119 Many skiers found the package convenient because 
it allowed them to purchase a single ticket, without having to determine 
in advance which mountain or mountains they planned to ski over the 
next six days. 120 Thus, the package sale economized on the search costs 
that consumers might otherwise have incurred before choosing which 
mountains to ski. 121 
Two years later, in 1964, a merger reduced the number of independent 
firms to two-Aspen Highlands Corp. (Highlands) and Aspen Skiing 
113 See Meese, supra note 53, at 134-41; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES 83-84 (1975) (concluding that technological considerations cannot explain 
vertical integration or the boundaries of firms). 
114 But see Meese, supra note 53, at 166 (explaining how contractual restrictions can 
facilitate process of bringing innovations to the market). 
115 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 588-89 (1985). 
116 Id. at 589. 
117 ld. 
lis Id. 
119 See id. 
120 ld. at 588-89. 
121 Cf Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 
497 (1983) (explaining how mandatory package sale could economize on search costs). 
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Co. (Ski Co.)-and the two remaining firms continued the joint ticket 
arrangement. 122 At the same time, the firms discontinued the coupon 
book; substituting an "around the neck" single ticket good for the entire 
week at either company's slopes or combination thereof. 123 Employees 
at Highlands recorded the ticket numbers of skiers who used these tickets 
on its slopes, and the parties relied on this data to apportion the revenue 
produced by the tickets between them. 124 
The parties discontinued the all-Aspen ticket during the 1972-1973 
season because of concerns that the method of allocating revenues 
produced by the ticket was not sufficiently precise.125 After a one-year 
hiatus, the parties reintroduced the ticket, this time apportioning reve-
nues according to the results of a random sample survey. 126 The parties 
maintained this system for the next four years, that is, through the 
1976-1977 ski season. During this period, Highlands's share of the reve-
nue derived from the all-Aspen ticket fell from 17.5 percent in 1973-1974 
to 13.2 percent in 1976-1997.127 In 1977 multi-area tickets accounted 
for 35 percent of the total sales in the Aspen market. 128 
In 1977 Ski Co. sought to change the manner of apportioning revenues 
from the joint ticket for the upcoming season. In particular, Ski Co. 
proposed that Highlands accept a flat percentage of the revenues gener-
ated by the joint ticket program. 129 Initially, Ski Co. proposed that High-
lands accept a 13.2 percent share of the joint ticket revenues, the same 
share that Highlands had received in the 1976-1977 ski season as a result 
of the random sample method of allocation. 130 Highlands resisted this 
allocation, claiming that the 1976-1977 season was an anomaly because 
unfavorable weather had reduced the number of visiting skiers. More-
over, Highlands hoped to continue allocating revenues based on actual 
usage, so it could employ local advertising and promotion to lure skiers 
to its site after they had purchased the joint ticket. 131 In the end, however, 
Highlands accepted a 15 percent share of the revenues attributable to 
122 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 589. 
123 !d. at 590. Moreover, in 1967 Ski Co. opened a second mountain, Snowmass. See id. 
at 588. 
124 !d. at 590. 
125 !d. 
126 !d. 
127 To be precise, Highlands earned 17.5% of this revenue in 1973-1974, 18.5% in 
1974-1975, 16.8% in 1975-1976, and 13.2 % 1976-1977. !d. 
128 !d. at 591. 
129 !d. 
130 !d. 
131 !d. at 591-92. 
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the joint ticket, a figure higher than what it had received the previous 
year but slightly below the average figure for the previous four seasons. 132 
The next year Ski Co. made Highlands a less generous offer, namely, 
to pay the latter 12.5 percent of the revenues generated by the ticket 
package.133 Highlands declined this offer, thus ending the joint ticket 
package.134 Highlands then sought to replicate the package, by purchas-
ing lift tickets from Ski Co. and bundling them with Highlands's own 
tickets to create a new package offering. 135 Ski Co. declined to sell such 
tickets to Highlands at wholesale or even retail prices, leading Highlands 
to offer an improvised package-"the Adventure Pack"-comprised of 
tickets to its own slopes and vouchers for tickets at slopes owned by 
Ski Co. 136 
Highlands challenged Ski Co.'s conduct as a refusal to deal. A jury 
found that Ski Co. was a monopolist and its refusal to deal with Highlands 
contravened Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, 
rejecting Ski Co.'s argument that it had no duty to cooperate with its 
rival and former venture partner. 137 In so doing, the Court explained 
that a refusal that severely disadvantaged rivals could still survive Sherman 
Act scrutiny if it was necessary to further competition on the merits. 138 
Applying this test, the Court emphasized that Ski Co. had entered the 
joint ticketing arrangement voluntarily, and the arrangement apparently 
had served the interests of both parties and consumers for several years. 139 
By terminating the arrangement, the Court said, Ski Co. had disadvan-
taged Highlands severely and also had injured consumers who would 
have preferred the convenience of the all-Aspen ticket. 140 The Court also 
rejected the firm's business justification, holding that Ski Co.'s refusal 
to deal was not justified by Highlands's purported low quality or a desire 
to properly apportion revenues from the joint ticketing arrangement.141 
The Court found it noteworthy that Ski Co. relied upon a count by lift 
132 /d. The average figure for the previous four seasons was 16.5%. 
133 /d. at 592. 
134 /d. at 593. 
135 /d. at 592-94. 
136 /d. at 594. 
137 Id. at 600-11. 
138 /d. at 605 n.32. 
139 /d. at 603 ("[T]he monopolist elected to make an important change in a pattern of 
distri?,ution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several 
years. ). 
140 Id. at 605-08; see also id. at 603 ("[I]t seems appropriate to infer that such tickets 
satisfy consumer demand in free competitive markets."). 
141 /d. at 608-10. 
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operators to monitor the usage of its own mountains, thereby implying 
that a similar method was appropriate for the joint ticket arrangement. 142 
The Court also found it relevant, though not dispositive, that Ski Co. 
had embarked subsequently upon an advertising campaign implying that 
its mountains were the only skiing destinations in the Aspen area. 143 
These considerations, the Court said, justified the jury's conclusion that 
Ski Co.'s conduct had excluded Highlands on "some basis other than 
efficiency." 144 Put another way, Ski Co.'s refusal to deal both injured 
Highlands severely and did not constitute competition on the merits. 145 
B. CRITIQUE 
The result in Aspen could make sense if technological competttion 
on t_he merits, based upon State-defined property rights, was the only 
legitimate form of economic activity. If this were the case, then it would 
seem proper to condemn the defendant because its refusal seems to 
have been unrelated to what courts deem to be merits-based competition. 
As noted earlier, however, legitimate competition can take many forms, 
not all of which constitute competition on the merits as traditionally 
understood. 146 It might therefore make sense to ask whether Ski Co.'s 
refusal to deal with Highlands was part of some effort to overcome a 
market failure, for instance, by relying upon the institution of contract 
to create the economic equivalent of a property right. 147 
To answer this question, it is first necessary to specify with greater 
precision just what, exactly, Ski Co. did. While many commentators have 
characterized the firm's actions as a refusal to cooperate with Highlands, 
the truth is a bit more complicated. 148 After all, Ski Co. did not, initially, 
142 Id. at 609. 
143 !d. at 611 n.43. 
144 !d. at 605 (defining conduct as exclusionary for antitrust purposes if the "firm has 
been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency"') (quoting RoBERT 
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138 ( 1978)); id. at 604 (describing jury instruction 
distinguishing "between practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition on the 
one hand, and the success of a business which reflects only a superior product, a well-
run business, or luck, on the other."). 
145 !d. at 605 n.32 ('" [E]xclusionary' [conduct] comprehends at the most behavior that 
not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further 
competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.") (quoting 3 
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST 78 (1978)). 
146 See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text (explaining how some useful competi-
tion takes a "contractual" form). 
147 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining how contracts can create the 
economic equivalent of property rights). 
148 See, e.g., WarrenS. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias Against Small Business: Kodak, 
Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 231, 264 (2001) (characteriz-
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refuse to deal with Highlands. Instead, Ski Co. offered to continue 
participating in the all-Aspen ticket, without changing the package's 
format. At the same time, the firm insisted upon a continuation of the 
revenue allocation method that the parties had adopted before the 
immediately preceding season. 149 That is to say, the firm insisted that 
Highlands again receive only a fixed percentage share of the total reve-
nues derived from the all-Aspen ticket. This time, however, Ski Co. 
insisted that Highlands accept only 12.5 percent of the total revenues, 
instead of the 15 percent Highlands had received in the previous season. 
Ski Co.'s offer was backed by an implicit threat to cease dealing alto-
gether. Still, all bargaining begins with each party owning its own property 
and labor, and such ownership entails the ability to exclude others. 150 
The mere fact that a proposed contract is backed by the existence and 
enforcement of property rights does not transform the proposed agree-
ment into a refusal to deal. Highlands lost access to the all-Aspen ticket 
because it would not agree to Ski Co.'s terms. 151 One might even say that 
it was Highlands that refused to deal with Ski Co. 
Were the terms that Ski Co. offered Highlands anticompet1t1ve or 
exclusionary? The Court did not address this question, and there is no 
indication that reducing Highlands's share of the revenues from the 
joint ticket fortified whatever market power Ski Co. may have possessed. 
No doubt Highlands would have preferred a larger share of the revenues 
from the all-Aspen ticket, but the Court did not articulate any methodol-
ogy for determining which proportion was the correct one. Instead, the 
Court chose to focus upon the outright refusal that followed the impasse, 
examining the impact of this refusal-and not Ski Co.'s preferred 
terms-on Highlands and consumers. At one level, the agreement that 
Ski Co. proposed reduced competition on the merits, by depriving High-
lands of the incentive to compete for skiers who had purchased the all-
Aspen ticket and thus already chosen Aspen over other possible skiing 
ing Ski Co.'s conduct as a refusal to deal); Baker, supra note 90, at 499-500 (characterizing 
Ski Co.'s decision as a change in business policy that severely disadvantaged Highlands 
by eliminating the joint ticket offering); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License 
Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 193, 196-97 
(1999) ("In Aspen Skiing, the defendant ... discontinued a joint marketing arrangement 
with the plaintiff, its much smaller and only competitor. The action was apparently taken 
to drive the plaintiff out of business and to monopolize the ski resort business in Vail."). 
1<9 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 592-93. 
150 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text; see also Robinson, supra note 82, at 
ll78-79 (explaining how refusals to deal are usually a means to some other end). 
151 See Robinson, supra note 82, at II99-200 (noting that the Aspen decision rested in 
part on the Court's disapproval of bargaining terms offered by Ski Co.). 
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venues. 152 Such an analysis is incomplete, however, because it assumes a 
fixed stock of purchasers for such tickets, for which the two firms would 
then compete. 153 But, of course, the number of such purchasers is not 
exogenous, but instead depends upon advertising and other promotional 
efforts that lured customers to the Aspen area in the first place. Such 
promotional efforts seemed particularly important in this case, given 
that so many skiers came from out of state and apparently had numerous 
other skiing options. 154 
Theory suggests that the quantity of such advertising was itself not 
exogenous, but was instead a function of background institutions, includ-
ing the contractual relationship between the parties. 155 Under the 
approach to allocating revenues praised by the Court, a party that adver-
tised skiing in Aspen and/or the all-Aspen ticket would have no guarantee 
of recapturing that investment. For, instance, if advertising by Ski Co. 
lured a skier to Aspen, he then could decide to ski only Highlands's 
mountain, even if he had purchased an all-Aspen ticket. If so, under a 
revenue allocation scheme based on actual usage-even usage perfectly 
recorded and calculated-Ski Co. would receive no revenue whatsoever 
from the all-Aspen ticket, even if its advertising and reputation were but-
for causes of the skier's trip to Aspen and resulting purchase of the all-
Aspen ticket. Put another way, the arrangement that was in place for 
most of the 1960s and 1970s left Ski Co. vulnerable to free riding by 
Highlands, free riding that could deter Ski Co. from investing in advertis-
ing in the first place. 156 
A concern over possible free riding makes sense out of Ski Co.'s 
insistence on changing the formula for allocating revenue derived from 
the all-Aspen ticket. By capping Highlands's proportion of the revenues 
generated by the joint ticket, the new arrangement ensured that Ski Co. 
could internalize a large proportion of the fruits of its advertising. 157 In 
152 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591-92. 
153 The Court, however, apparently took this approach. 
154 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593. 
155 Cf Coase, supra note 26, at 713-18 (background rules can alter content of economic 
activity); Lester G. Telser, ~y Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 
89 (1960) (explaining how minimum resale price maintenance-a particular contractual 
institution-can encourage advertising expenditures). 
156 See Frank H. Easterbrook, On IdentifYing Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 
972, 975-76 (1986) (contending that Highlands was free riding on Ski Co.'s creation and 
maintenance of an attractive skiing destination). 
157 Cf id. at 976 ("The demand that Highlands accept 12.5% of the proceeds, even if 
in an average year skiers spent 16% of their time on Highlands' slopes, could have been 
a way to compensate Skiing for producing the customers."). 
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this way, the new arrangement employed the institution of contract to 
create a partial property right in the fruits of Ski Co.'s promotional 
investments. 158 The right was neither perfect nor complete, insofar as 
some benefits of Ski Co.'s advertising would still spill over to Highlands. 
Still, such a spillover was a necessary incident to the existence of any 
joint ticketing arrangement. Few property rights are perfect, as the costs 
of creating and enforcing such perfection often outweigh the benefits. 159 
If Ski Co.'s insistence upon a changed allocation formula was in fact 
an effort to create a contractual property right, then the subsequent 
refusal to deal may be irrelevant from an antitrust standpoint. After all, 
contractual negotiations generally begin with the assumption that either 
side can refuse to deal with the other. By itself, hard bargaining should 
not violate the Sherman Act. Moreover the prospect of legal condemna-
tion of a post-negotiation refusal to deal and resulting treble damages 
would cast a long shadow over the antecedent bargaining process. For, 
at the outset of such bargaining, both parties would know that, if Ski 
Co. offered Highlands a less generous proportion of revenues than it 
had previously received, a court applying the Aspen rule faithfully would 
treat such new terms as a refusal to deal. Highlands could thus walk 
away from the table and punish Ski Co. for its subsequent and resulting 
refusal to deal. With this arrow in its quiver, Highlands could convince 
Ski Co. to offer it unduly generous terms, perhaps even to the point of 
exploiting investments that Ski Co. had made specific to the joint ticket 
arrangement. 160 The prospect of such opportunism could deter Ski Co. 
from making such specific investments in the first place, thus depriving 
155 Cf Meese, supra note 52 (explaining how exclusive territories and minimum resale 
price maintenance can function as contractual property rights); see also Easterbrook, supra 
note 156, at 976. 
159 See BARZEL, supra.note 9, at 92-94 (explaining that owners will sometimes decline to 
enforce aspects of their property rights when doing so would be unduly expensive). Of 
course, Ski Co. could have created a perfect property right by purchasing Highlands and 
thus offering a joint ticket itself. The company did exactly that some years later, and the 
enforcement agencies chose not to challenge the transaction, apparently because they 
did not consider skiing in Aspen a relevant market. See Grimes, supra note 149, at 264. 
However, if "skiing in or near Aspen" had been deemed a relevant market, then such a 
merger may have offended § 7 of the Clayton Act or even § 2 itself, as the jury found, 
despite the resulting efficiencies. Whether such a merger should, in fact, offend the 
antitrust laws is a separate question. However, current merger law and the policies of the 
enforcement agencies barely recognize non-technological efficiencies as justifications for 
mergers to monopoly. See Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals' Costs: Can the Agencies Do More 
Harm than Good?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 241 (2003). 
160 See generally Timothy J. Muris, opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. 
L. REv. 521, 523-24 (1981) (explaining how presence of specific investments can render 
party vulnerable to opportunism). 
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the skiing public of the benefits of specialization that such investments 
foster. 161 By banning refusals to deal in this context, then, antitrust law 
could deter useful economic activity ex ante and distort the ex post 
process of adjusting contractual terms in light of developments not 
anticipated at the time of contracting. 162 
Proponents of the Aspen decision might respond by claiming that Ski 
Co. could have furthered its objective in a different manner. For, after 
negotiations between the parties had broken down, Highlands offered to 
purchase tickets to Ski Co.'s slopes at retail prices, tickets that Highlands 
would have included in its own version of an all-Aspen ticket. 163 Presum-
ably this retail price reflected the costs of Ski Co.'s advertising, including 
the costs of advertising and distributing the ticket package itself. Thus, 
conceding that the traditional allocation formula was flawed, one might 
nonetheless argue that Ski Co. could have accomplished its legitimate 
objective to prevent Highlands from free riding simply by selling High-
lands its tickets at the same price it charged retail customers, thereby 
inducing Highlands to pay for the cost of the advertising that convinced 
skiers to travel to Aspen in the first place. Ski Co.'s failure to follow this 
course, and its decision instead to offer its rival less generous terms than 
it offered ultimate consumers, might therefore suggest that the refusal 
was exclusionary and not simply incidental to an effort to bargain for a 
legitimate contractual property right. 164 
This argument does not withstand analysis, however. Ski Co. discrimi-
nated against Highlands, charging it a different price (i.e., an inifinitely 
161 See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in 
COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAw AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
7-8, 11-14 (Steven Medema ed., 1998) (explaining how elimination of the threat of 
opportunism can encourage welfare-enhancing specific investment); see also Muris, supra 
note 160, at 524; see also Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 356, 356-57 ( 1980) (explaining that opportunistic exploi-
tation of relationship-specific investments "is not a long-run equilibrium phenomenon"). 
162 See Charles ]. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REv. 1089, 1090-91 (1981) (explaining how unanticipated circumstances can require 
adjustment in parties' respective obligations); id. at 1101-02 (explaining that a party may 
be vulnerable to opportunism when it makes specialized investments that yield deferred 
returns). 
163 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593-94. 
164 See Elhauge, supra note 75, at 308 (arguing that "an antitrust rule preventing [Ski 
Co.'s refusal to sell tickets at retail] does not deprive the defendant of any right to set 
the rate of reimbursement for its investments, past or current."). Professor Elhauge con-
tends that a monopolist's discrimination against rivals raises a presumption that the refusal 
is unlawful exclusion. At the same time, he contends that defendants should be able to 
rebut the presumption by establishing an efficiency justification for such discrimination. 
See id. at 305-14 (contending that such discrimination should be a necessary but not 
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high price) than it charged ordinary retail customers. But, if Highlands 
was a free rider, then there was good reason for this discrimination. For, 
charging Highlands the same price for Ski Co. tickets as Ski Co. charged 
the general public would not, in fact, compensate Ski Co. for the benefits 
that its advertising conferred on Highlands. Presumably the advertising 
component of Ski Co.'s retail price reflects the cost of enticing a particu-
lar skier to Ski Co.'s slopes for a given day. In other words, assuming 
that the cost of enticing a given skier to the Aspen region is fixed, and 
assuming that a person skis at Aspen for several days, then presumably 
a daily ticket price would reflect only the pro-rated cost of the advertising 
necessary to attract the skier to the region. If, by contrast, Ski Co. were 
to include the entire fixed cost of advertising in the price of a daily 
retail ticket, it would end up overcharging any skier who purchased more 
than one such ticket and, thus, unduly deter skiers from visiting its 
slopes. 
If one assumes that Ski Co. priced its tickets by pro-rating the cost of 
advertising in this manner, then simply selling tickets to Highlands at 
retail would not, in fact, induce Highlands to internalize the full cost of 
the promotional investment that lured skiers to the Aspen region. For 
instance, Highlands might sell its version of the all-Aspen ticket to a 
skier who, after arriving in Aspen, decided to spend most of her time 
skiing at Highlands, while only spending a day or two at Ski Co.'s moun-
tains. In such a case, Highlands would end up paying for only a portion 
of the cost of the advertising that drew the skier to Aspen in the first 
place. Indeed, the whole point of Highlands's alternative all-Aspen ticket 
was to attract consumers who would spend only a portion of their time 
skiing on Ski Co.'s three mountains. 165 If free riding by Highlands was 
a true threat, then Ski Co.'s refusal to deal, or credible threat to do so, 
may have been the only plausible way to induce Highlands to negotiate 
in good faith for the creation of a contractual property right. 166 
sufficient condition for establishing unlawful exclusion). Professor Elhauge does not dis-
cuss the possibility that Highlands was free riding on Ski Co.'s promotional efforts or that 
Ski Co.'s refusal was part of an effort to negotiate a contractual property right. 
165 See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 594 (reporting that Highlands developed an alternative adven-
ture pack, which included a three-day pass at.Highlands and three vouchers equal to the 
price of a daily ticket at Ski Co.'s mountains). It is not clear from the decision whether 
the daily lift tickets that Highlands sought to purchase from Ski Co. were refundable. If 
they were, then a customer could have purchased Highlands's proposed package, skied 
on Highlands's mountain for three days, turned in its Ski Co. ticket for a refund, and 
then purchased an additional three-day pass from Highlands. Under such an admittedly 
rare scenario, Highlands's free ride would be complete. 
166 See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed fixed 
allocation of revenues from all-Aspen ticket could function as imperfect contractual prop-
erty right). 
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It does not appear that Ski Co. raised the claim that its refusal to deal 
or proposed allocation scheme had the effect of combating free riding. 167 
Hence, the record of the decision is not developed on this point. Still, 
the opinion refers to some evidence that is consistent with an assertion 
that Highlands was, in fact, free riding upon Ski Co.'s promotional 
investments. For instance, Highlands expressly argued that it preferred 
the traditional method of allocating revenue from the joint ticket because 
this method allowed it to compete with Ski Co. for customers once they 
. arrived in Aspen. 168 Moreover, after Ski Co. severed its relationship with 
Highlands, Ski Co. embarked upon an aggressive nationwide advertising 
campaign. Indeed, the Court even accused Ski Co. of tailoring its advertis-
ing so as to "strongly imply" that Aspen contained only three mountains-
the ones owned by Ski Co. 169 For instance, an advertisement in a national 
magazine showed four mountains, but only named those owned by Ski 
Co. 170 Also, Ski Co. installed a new sign in the Aspen airport which 
depicted all four mountains but again only named those owned by Ski 
Co. 171 Ironically, the Court treated these steps as evidence that Ski Co. 
was engaged in unlawful exclusion. 172 But in the end Ski Co. simply may 
have been attempting to ensure that it was advertising only its own 
product and not that of a rival. 173 Thus, far from suggesting some form of 
predation, these steps, as well as Ski Co.'s efforts to alter the allocational 
formula, are all at least equally consistent with a claim that Highlands 
was free riding upon Ski Co.'s creation and promotion of three moun-
tains that constituted an attractive skiing destination. 174 
Of course, it may be that the benefits of any contractual property 
right were illusory. Or, it may be that there was a less-restrictive means 
167 While this oversight might seem strange to modern eyes, it should be recalled that 
the litigation began in 1979, just two years after the Supreme Court first recognized, in 
a decision under§ 1, that non-standard contracts could prevent free riding. See Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-56 (1977). It is not surprising, then, that 
lawyers did not immediately extend the logic of this decision to the § 2 context, particularly 
in light of the fact that Highlands focused its challenge on Ski Co.'s refusal to deal and 
not upon the new allocation scheme that it enforced in one year and sought to alter 
slightly in the next. 
168 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591-92. 
169 /d. at 593 n.12. 
110 Jd. 
171 /d. at 593. 
172 /d. at 611 n.43. 
173 See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6-11 (1982) (explaining 
how exclusive dealing contracts can create the equivalent of property rights by ensuring 
that dealers do not steer customers to products sold by non-advertising manufacturers); 
see also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (holding§ 2 does not require a monopolist to advertise the products of its rivals). 
174 See Easterbrook, supra note 156, at 975-76. 
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of achieving the very same benefits. Still, by characterizing Ski Co.'s 
bargaining conduct as a refusal to deal and ignoring Ski Co.'s effort to 
bargain for a contractual property right, the Court ensured that courts 
would ignore such factual questions in future cases and endorsed an 
approach to Section 2 analysis that neglects the possibility that refusals 
to deal are part of larger efforts to create or enforce contractual prop-
erty rights. 175 
C. FARE WELL TO ASPEN 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's recent Trinka decision seems 
to reject any general requirement that a monopolist justify its refusal to 
deal with rivals. 176 At the same time, the Court declined to immunize all 
such refusals, choosing instead to endorse the result and reasoning of 
Aspen. To be precise, the Court opined that the particular facts of Aspen 
had properly given rise to an inference that Ski Co. had "forsake [n] 
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end." 177 In so doing, the 
Court echoed the federal enforcement agencies, which endorsed Aspen's 
reasoning on this score in an amicus curiae brief filed in TrinkaY8 The 
Court also echoed lower courts and scholars who have read Aspen to ban 
refusals to deal in similar circumstances. 179 Alive and well despite Trinka, 
then, Aspen serves as a paradigm that courts and the enforcement agen-
cies apply to evaluate refusal to deal claims. 180 The realization that Ski 
175 The Court thus repeated the mistake of those who would treat "group boycotts" as 
distinct antitrust offenses, without regard to the purpose of the boycott. As some have 
argued, however, such boycotts are generally efforts to enforce, by self-help, some underly-
ing agreement, which must itself be analyzed to determine the true impact of the boycott. 
See Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Such boycotts 
rarely exist in a vacuum."). 
176 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
177 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 409 (2004) (citing Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608, 610-11). 
178 See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States & FTC in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, No. 02-682 at 16-17 (May 23, 2003). 
179 See Image Technical Sen'S., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1211 (9th Cir. 
1997) ("Like the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing, we are faced with a situation in which a 
monopolist made a conscious choice to change an established pattern of distribution to 
the detriment of competitors."); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 
F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that "the rich soil of competition had produced 
the all-mountain ticket in Aspen and other multimountain areas" and that "Ski Co.'s 
decision to eliminate the ticket in later years was a sign that the weeds of monopoly had 
begun to take hold."); see also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW 
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 116 (2000) (endorsing the reasoning of the 
Aspen decision on this score). 
180 See KUHN, supra note 3, at 23-24 (explaining how scientific community embraces 
paradigms that purportedly solve salient problems and then apply those paradigms to 
problems deemed analogous); id. at 23 (analogizing scientific paradigms to "accepted 
judicial decisions in the common law"). 
112 ANTITRUST LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 73 
Co. may have been bargaining for a contractual property right also 
contravenes the Aspen Court's assertion that certain facts made Ski Co.'s 
refusal to deal especially problematic. Recall here that the Court empha-
sized that the parties entered and adhered to the joint ticketing arrange-
ment "voluntarily," in a "competitive market," and these factors rendered 
the initial arrangement and its allocational formula presumptively effi-
cient.181 Recall also the Court's claim that consumers derived benefits 
from the all-Aspen ticket, and they suffered when Ski Co. refused to 
cooperate with Highlands after the bargaining impasse. 182 These facts, 
the Court said, enhanced the possibility that Ski Co.'s refusal to deal 
was predatory and thus helped support the jury's verdict. 183 
Far from suggesting anything sinister, the facts invoked by the Court 
were equally consistent with an effort to create and enforce contractual 
property rights. While the parties initially had embraced the allocational 
scheme endorsed by the Court, Ski Co., at least, had second thoughts 
as early as 1972.184 This re-thinking should be no surprise: parties often 
find, after trial and error, that an organizational form once deemed 
efficient no longer serves their needs. 185 Indeed, one year before their 
impasse, the parties had agreed to alter fundamentally the method of 
allocating revenue from the joint ticket, creating a contractual property 
right by capping Highlands's proportion of the revenues attributable to 
the joint ticket. 186 Ski Co.'s refusal to deal stemmed from Highlands's 
refusal to accept a seemingly small modification to the terms of the new 
allocation method Highlands had agreed to the previous year. 1B7 
Ski Co. had presumably found the original method of allocation effi-
cient in 1962, when the all-Aspen ticket was first introduced. 188 Moreover, 
some consumers preferred the all-Aspen ticket to the alternatives. Still, 
neither of these facts suggests that Ski Co.'s efforts to alter the method 
of allocation were exclusionary in any relevant antitrust sense. A practice 
efficient in 1962 is not necessarily efficient in 1977. The process of 
181 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text. 
184 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593 (explaining that the parties did not employ the all-Aspen ticket 
during the 1972-1973 season due to concerns over allocation of revenues). 
185 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (recounting 
how Sylvania had reconfigured its distribution system in response to slumping sales). 
186 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591-92. 
187 /d. at 592-93. 
188 /d. at 589. 
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finding the right organizational form involves trial and error. 189 Perhaps 
the expansion in air travel since 1962 made interstate promotion and 
advertising more important in 1977 than it was in 1962.190 Or, perhaps 
Ski Co.'s significant advertising between 1962-1977 made free riding by 
Highlands more lucrative in 1977 than it was 15 years earlier. Ironically, 
the very longevity of the arrangement invoked by the Court may have 
been a factor that required the parties to change it. Perhaps both factors 
were at work simultaneously. In short, there is no reason to presume that 
a practice selected by the parties in 1962 was still efficient 16 years later. 
Nor did it matter that some consumers preferred the all-Aspen ticket 
to other options. Consumers often prefer market results that are the 
product of a market failure, reflecting opportunism. For instance, if one 
dealer free rides on another dealer's efforts, it will charge prices that 
do not reflect the cost of the promotional effort that informed consumers 
of the benefits of the product sold by the two dealers. Consumers will 
be perfectly happy to free ride-obtaining (free) information from one 
dealer and then purchasing the product at a relatively low price from a 
second dealer who does not provide such information. Moreover, any 
practice that eliminates such free riding, for instance, by assigning exclu-
sive territories, will displease at least those consumers .who had grown 
accustomed to free riding. 
In any event, the Aspen Court's invocation of consumer preferences 
is simply an alternate manifestation of its mischaracterization of Ski Co.'s 
conduct as a refusal to deal. After all, Ski Co. wished to continue with 
the all-Aspen ticket and thus continue dealing with Highlands. It simply 
wanted to alter (slightly) the terms of the new allocational formula the 
parties had adopted the previous year. Ski Co. refused to deal with 
Highlands (and vice versa) only because the parties could not agree 
upon what proportion of revenues Highlands should receive. There is 
no indication in the decision that consumers had expressed a preference 
for any particular method of revenue allocation. Thus, the Court's focus 
on the harm that Ski Co.'s bargaining tactic visited upon consumers 
simply confirms that the Court improperly failed to consider the possibil-
ity that Ski Co. was refusing to deal with Highlands as part of an effort 
to negotiate an efficient contractual property right, an arrangement that 
may well have served consumer interests in the longer run. 
189 See Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 5 ("It is useful for many purposes to think of market 
behavior as random. Firms try dozens of practices. Most of them are flops, and the firms 
must try something else or disappear."). 
190 Between 1960 and 1977, the n urn ber of passengers carried by U.S. carriers quadrupled. 
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1978 at 671 tbl. no. 1134 (99th ed.). 
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In short, any effort to distinguish the refusal to deal in Aspen from 
other refusals does not withstand scrutiny. Ski Co.'s. conduct was not a 
classic, property-based refusal designed to reap the rewards of technologi-
cal innovation or economies of scale. 191 Still, such competition on the 
merits is not the only form of useful economic conduct. Firms can also 
enhance welfare by relying upon contracts that create the economic 
equivalent of property rights. 192 Each of the facts highlighted by the 
Court-either alone or viewed as a whole-seems at least equally consis-
tent with a claim (not made by Ski Co.) that the firm's refusal was part 
of an effort to negotiate a contractual property right. As a result, such 
facts simply cannot give rise to a presumption that an otherwise valid 
refusal to deal creates competitive harm.193 While such a presumption 
may have been justified based upon the state of economic theory in 1978, 
this logic simply cannot survive more recent economic developments. 194 
Courts should therefore redraw the outer boundaries of liability for 
refusals to deal. 
191 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (describing law's hands-off approach 
to such refusals). 
192 See supra notes 17, 106-112 and accompanying text. 
193 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587-95 (1986) 
(noting that evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as with anticompetitive 
objectives cannot, without more, support an inference of anticompetitive conduct); 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'! 
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968) (same). 
194 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,466-67 (1992) 
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities 
are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). 
